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Fiscal Equalization, Capitalization  




We investigate the impact of equalizing grants to municipalities on local house prices in the 
Netherlands. Our identification exploits a nonlinear time-pattern in the implementation of a 
reform of the grant allocation system, which was gradually introduced and carried out in two 
subsequent stages that targeted different policy domains. Results indicate that the change in 
grants was fully capitalized. We also find that only a small fraction was passed on to residents 
through property taxes, consistent with the flypaper effect. Furthermore, we rule out a 
significant effect on the size of the local bureaucracy. Hence, changes in grants appear to have 
been largely accommodated through an adjustment of the provision of public services that are 
valued by the marginal homebuyer. A placebo reform, in which additional funds for 
municipalities came with a new responsibility for school accommodation, had no significant 
effect on house prices. 
 
 
JEL classification: H7, H81, R2, R3, R51 
 





In most countries, local governments are partly funded by central government grants and in 
many cases, the grant allocation system takes account of disparities in either spending needs, 
fiscal capacity or both.1 This paper provides new empirical evidence on the capitalization of 
equalizing grants into local house prices. We consider a reform of the allocation system of 
unconditional general grants to municipalities in the Netherlands, which increased the weight 
of socioeconomic characteristics, such as poverty rates and the share of minorities, and 
introduced partial equalization of tax capacity. Reform-induced changes in annual grants 
varied considerably over municipalities, with a standard deviation of 56 euro per inhabitant. 
Such changes are expected to capitalize when they are accommodated through an adjustment 
of public service levels or tax rates, which affect the local willingness to pay for housing. 
 Our identification exploits a non-linearity in the time pattern of reform-induced 
changes in grants. In order to allow municipalities to adjust their policies, transition grants 
were used to cushion changes and the reform was carried out in two stages, starting in 1997 
and 2001, respectively, that targeted different categories of variables in the allocation system. 
With data on grants from 1992 to 2010 and a municipal house price index from 1995 to 2010, 
the resulting nonlinear time pattern allows us to control for any municipality-specific linear 
trends in unobserved variables that may correlate with grants and house prices.  
 Estimation results indicate full capitalization at a real discount rate of 3 per cent, a 
result which is robust to identifying on either of the two stages of the reform separately. We 
further validate our identification strategy by considering a placebo reform, which made 
municipalities responsible for school buildings and provided the corresponding resources. As 
expected, changes in grants induced by this reform do not significantly affect house prices 
because, in contrast to the general grant reform, in this case the extra money came with new 
spending responsibilities and could not be spent freely on improving public services or 
lowering tax rates.  
 In order to shed light on the channel through which changes in grants have induced 
changes in house prices, we investigate the extent to which municipalities have 
accommodated these changes through an adjustment of local taxes. Conventional economic 
theory predicts that changes in grants will be passed on to residents almost entirely through 
                                                 
1 For example, fiscal equalization is common in Europe and it has a long tradition in Canada, Australia and some 
developing countries like India. While equalizing grants from the federal to state governments are limited in the 
US, many states provide equalizing grants to local jurisdictions – notably school districts. 
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this channel, as the marginal propensity to spend on local public services should be the same 
for grants and for private income, for which 10 per cent is a plausible upper estimate.2 
However, we find that property tax revenue, which is the only relevant source of local tax 
revenue in the Netherlands, falls with only about 16 cents for each euro of additional grants. 
The propensity for local governments to spend a large share of grants is known in the 
economic literature as the flypaper effect.3 As far we know, our paper is the first to relate this 
well-documented phenomenon to house price capitalization.  
 Capitalization indicates how people value the way in which municipalities spend their 
money and in this respect, it offers a new perspective on the flypaper effect. While at odds 
with conventional economic theory, this effect would appear to be less of an anomaly if rather 
than passing them on through local taxes, local governments choose to spend changes in 
grants in a way that is largely valued by local residents. Under admittedly stringent 
assumptions, full capitalization implies that the level of local public service provision is 
efficient, as the marginal euro of grants is converted into one euro of value for residents – 
consistent with the well-known Samuelson condition.4 While this result does not hold up in a 
sorting framework with heterogeneous tastes for local public goods and for locations, 
capitalization in such a framework still indicates that at least the marginal homebuyer attaches 
considerable value to how the marginal euro of grants is spent.5  
 It follows that capitalization is difficult to reconcile with a particular class of 
explanations for the flypaper effect that are based on local government failure. In this strand 
of the literature, Wyckoff (1988) demonstrates the existence of a ‘bureaucratic flypaper 
effect’ under the assumptions that local bureaucrats are interested in maximizing the budget of 
their departments rather than serving the public interest and that voters are uninformed about 
the amount of grants that local governments receive (see also Filimon et al., 1982). In a more 
recent paper, Brollo et al. (2013) propose a model in which additional grants allow self-
interested politicians to extract more rents from uninformed voters. Moreover, using Brazilian 
data, these authors also find empirically that more grants lead to more corruption and reduced 
quality of local politicians. Such effects of additional grants are unlikely to make local 
                                                 
2 Following Inman (2008), this assumes that the income elasticity of demand for local public services is smaller 
than one. Municipal spending does not exceed 10 per cent of GDP in the Netherlands.  
3 Hines and Thaler (1995) and Inman (2008) survey the literature and discuss possible explanations. See e.g. 
Dahlberg et al. (2008), Lutz (2010), Dahlby (2011) or Lundqvist (2013) for recent contributions.  
4 See Brueckner (1979, 1982). Barrow and Rouse (2004) adapt this theoretical framework to equalizing grants.  
5 See for instance the sorting model in Bayer et al. (2007). Hilber (2011) surveys the recent literature on house 
price capitalization and local public sector efficiency, emphasizing the role of supply constraints in this 
framework (see also Hilber and Vermeulen, 2014). The low elasticity of housing supply in the Netherlands 
(Vermeulen and Rouwendal, 2007) may thus further explain the high capitalization rate found in this paper.  
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communities more attractive to potential homebuyers, so we should expect house prices to be 
largely unaffected. 
 As an alternative test of the presence of a bureaucratic flypaper effect in the 
Netherlands, we explore the impact of the reform-induced change in grants on the number of 
municipal civil servants in full-time equivalents. Our estimate is not statistically significant, 
but it is sufficiently precise to rule out an economically meaningful effect.6 Thus, by and 
large, additional grants appear not to have been used to expand local bureaucracies.  
 The implications of capitalization extend beyond the valuation of local public services. 
In particular, it may jeopardize distributional objectives of fiscal equalization, which are 
generally viewed as an important justification (Oates, 1999). The reform that identifies our 
capitalization result benefitted low-income municipalities and our results suggest that local 
public services in these municipalities have improved as a result. However, residents who 
bought a house after the reform and renters in the private sector have paid the price in terms 
of higher housing costs, implying that for them the increase in public consumption has come 
at the expense of reduced private consumption. Renters in the social sector, which constitutes 
about a third of the total housing stock in the Netherlands, have gained only to the extent that 
housing associations have not passed on the change in housing value. The main beneficiaries, 
though, were homeowners and landlords prior to the reform, who were typically better off 
than the average citizen. The concluding section will elaborate on implications for policy.  
 In spite of a rich empirical literature on the capitalization of fiscal differentials into 
house prices, evidence on the capitalization of intergovernmental transfers is relatively 
scarce.7 Hilber et al. (2011) find evidence of substantial to full capitalization in a study of 
central government grants to local authorities in England. In their analysis, electoral targeting 
of grants by the incumbent Labour party provides the source of exogenous variation. In 
contrast, we identify on a reform that was designed to make the grant system more equitable, 
so that our analysis provides direct evidence on the impact of fiscal equalization. Moreover, 
the variation in reform-induced changes in grants in our analysis is considerably larger, 
enabling stronger and more robust identification.8  
                                                 
6 Using Swedish data, Lundqvist et al. (2014) also find that general grants do not stimulate employment in the 
local public sector in general, although they do find a positive and statistically significant effect on 
administrative personnel.  
7 The capitalization literature is surveyed in Chaudry-Shah (1988), Ross and Yinger (1999) and Hilber (2011). 
8 Identification in Hilber et al. (2011) is based on the positive but diminishing impact of Labour dominance on 
grants, after controlling for the linear effect of Labour's share of seats. An increase in Labour's share from 40 per 
cent to 50 per cent is found to reduce grants per capita by 13 pounds (year 2008), corresponding to 16 euros 
(year 2010). This figure may be contrasted to the standard deviation of reform-induced changes in annual grants 
of 56 euro per inhabitant in our analysis.  
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 Identifying on reforms of state school financing formulas, which have become more 
equalizing in many US states over their period of observation, Barrow and Rouse (2004) find 
evidence of full capitalization of state education aid to school districts. They instrument the 
actual change in state aid with the change in aid that each district would have received on the 
basis of the post-reform formulas and pre-reform characteristics. The validity of this approach 
relies on the assumption that changes in district housing values are not correlated with the pre-
reform district characteristics that are used to construct the instrument through other channels 
than capitalization. Our identification requires less restrictive assumptions in this respect, as 
we control for arbitrary linear time trends in grants and house prices.  
 The contributions of this paper may thus be summarized as follows. In the first place, 
our identification of the capitalization of equalizing grants into house prices is more direct and 
robust than in the two earlier papers on this topic. In the second place, we provide new 
evidence on the channel, thus relating our capitalization result to a longstanding literature on 
the flypaper effect. In the third place, our findings challenge explanations of this effect that 
are based on local government failure.  
 
 
2 Institutional setting and reform of grant allocation 
 
2.1 Local government in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands is a highly centralized country. Even though many governmental tasks have 
been assigned to municipalities, national regulation or guidelines ensure that basic public 
services are to a large extent uniform across the country.9 For instance, municipalities 
administer welfare, yet the norms for assignment and benefit levels are set nationally 
(Toolsema and Allers, 2014). About a third of the budget of municipalities is spent on welfare 
and social services. Other important tasks concern spatial planning, urban renewal, local 
infrastructure, waste collection and disposal, health care and cultural and recreational 
facilities. In contrast with many other countries, municipal responsibilities in the domain of 
education are mainly limited to the construction and upkeep of school buildings.  
A large proportion of these tasks benefits poorer households disproportionally. It is a 
well-known tenet of the classical theory of fiscal federalism that policies with a redistributive 
nature cannot be financed by local taxes without distorting the location choice of households 
                                                 
9 Allers (2011) and Bos (2012) describe task assignment and local government finance in the Netherlands.  
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(see e.g., Buchanan, 1950, or Boadway and Flatters, 1982). This institutional setup thus 
inherently requires some form of fiscal equalization.  
 Fiscal equalization in the Netherlands is based on the principle that each municipality 
should be able to provide the same level of services at the same property tax rate. It reflects 
the considerable popular resistance to nonmarginal differences in local public services and 
taxes in this country, arguably related to its small size and social homogeneity (Goedhart, 
1973). Unconditional general grants, which constitute more than a third of municipal revenue 
on average, are allocated on the basis of extended formulas that take account of local needs 
through a wide range of variables. Equalization of local tax capacity was introduced in the 
1997 grant reform.  
 Differences across municipalities are further diminished as central government grants 
constitute the main source of municipal revenue. Apart from an equalizing unconditional 
grant, municipalities receive many different conditional grants to finance mandated tasks. The 
share of local expenditure covered by local taxes does not exceed 10 per cent on average, 
which is exceptionally low from an international perspective (Blöchliger and King, 2006). 
The only important local taxes are property taxes. Some regulation of the amount by which 
municipalities can raise their property tax revenue has been introduced in 2006.10 The 
marginal role of property taxes also implies that a small increase in municipal income through 
this channel requires a large relative increase in the property tax rate. In order to increase local 
spending by one per cent, the property tax rate must be raised by 5 – 42 percent, depending on 
the municipality (Allers et al., 2010). The political cost of such an increase is likely to be 
considerable.11 Hence, in practice, municipalities have little discretion about their income.  
 The combination of limited income discretion and a dominant role of centrally 
assigned tasks may partly explain the high capitalization rate found in this paper. If the 
amount of funds that municipalities can freely spend according to their own preferences is 
limited, it is conceivable that a marginal increase in general grants that does not come with 
additional tasks will be spent on services that are efficiently or even underprovided. Hence, 
this could induce even more than full capitalization (Brueckner, 1979; 1982). 
 
  
                                                 
10 In 2006 and 2007, property tax rates were capped at the municipality level. In 2008, the central government 
introduced a ceiling on the total rise in property tax revenues of all municipalities, which is often binding, 
although individual municipalities can raise property taxes as much as they like.  
11 Allers and Elhorst (2005) provide evidence of yardstick competition on property tax rates in the Netherlands. 
The political costs are likely to be enhanced by the salience of the property tax (Cabral and Hoxby, 2012).  
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2.2 The reform of general grant allocation 
In 1997, a new system for the allocation of the (unconditional) general grant was introduced 
that changed the measurement of spending needs, equalized the local property tax base and, 
most importantly, adjusted the weights accorded to different types of spending needs.  
 The preceding grant allocation system measured needs on the basis of regression 
analysis of municipal spending, in a similar way as in various other countries (see e.g., Ladd, 
1994). However, the reverse impact of grant revenue on spending levels makes this approach 
problematic, particularly in the Netherlands where municipalities rely for a considerable part 
of their revenues on central government grants.12 Hence, the new method was partly based on 
judgement of acceptable spending levels instead – Boerboom and Huigsloot (2008) provide a 
detailed description.  
 The 1997 reform introduced the base of the property tax, which constitutes the main 
source of local tax revenue, as a new variable in the grant allocation formula. Note that it is 
not actual tax revenue that is equalized but the tax base, and that this base is equalized only 
partially.13 Notwithstanding this reform, spending needs still dominate the allocation formula 
of central government grants, as local tax revenue covers only a small part of municipal 
expenditure.  
 When it was introduced, the new grant allocation formula consisted of about 50 
variables. It put less weight than its predecessor on municipality size, while strengthening the 
equalization of spending needs relating to disparities in socioeconomic characteristics 
(poverty, minorities), physical characteristics (soil structure) and spillovers to adjacent 
municipalities. These changes were introduced in two stages. About two thirds of the re-
allocation of general grants took place in the 1997 stage and the remaining part of the revision 
came into effect in the 2001 stage. While the first stage focused on measures for 
socioeconomic composition and the burdens on central cities, the second stage covered 
mainly physical characteristics.  
 Summary statistics for the permanent changes in grants due to these two stages of the 
reform, divided by the population in 1997, are reported in Table 1. The redistributive nature 
of the reform is illustrated in Figure 1, which scatters the per capita change in grants resulting 
from both reforms together against personal income in 2001. The fitted trend in this figure 
                                                 
12 This ‘circularity problem’ has been noticed in the UK as well (Hall et al., 1996). 
13 During 1997-2000, property value assessment was not yet uniform and municipalities still used different base 
years. In 2001-2004, every municipality used 1999 as a base year; in 2005 and 2006, the base year was 2003, 
and in 2007, the base year was 2005. Since 2008, property values are assessed annually, the base year being the 
year before the fiscal year. 
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indicates that, on average, municipalities in which per capita income was 10% higher saw 
their annual grant reduced by almost 40 euro per inhabitant. Correlations with personal 
income in 2001 are reported for each stage separately in Table 2. Given the differences in 
focus, it is not surprising that the 1997 stage shows a particularly strong negative correlation 
with income, whereas the correlation of the 2001 stage with income turns out to be positive. 
The 1997 stage dominates the aggregate effect as this reform was larger.  
 A scatter of the 2001 stage-induced change in grants against the 1997 stage-induced 
change is shown in Figure 2. As seen in this figure and in Table 2, the two stages are weakly 
negatively correlated. By implication, we can meaningfully test the robustness of our 
identification strategy by constructing instruments on the basis of each stage separately.  
 The reform was introduced gradually in order to allow municipalities to adjust their 
policies. While the new formulas came into effect immediately, resulting changes in grants to 
individual municipalities were smoothed out over five year periods using transition grants 
(BZK, 1996). In the first stage (1997-2001), these transition grants ensured that a 
municipality’s annual grant change resulting from the revision of the allocation system was 
maximized at 5 per cent. In the fourth and last year of the transition grant, municipalities 
where the grant changed more than 25 per cent received a redemption grant to buy off future 
transition grants.14 Municipalities which gained as a result of the grant revision received 
negative transition grants. A similar transition applied in the second stage (2001-2005).15  
 As discussed in more detail in the next section, our identification of the causal impact 
of exogenous changes in general grants uses the variables ‘Reform of 1997’ and ‘Reform of 
2001’, defined as the sums of permanent changes due to both stages of the overall reform and 
the corresponding transition grants. Figure 3 illustrates the permanent changes and the 
variables Reform of 1997 and Reform of 2001 for the municipality of Amsterdam. 
Furthermore, we define the variable ‘Reforms of 1997 and 2001 jointly’ as the sum of Reform 
of 1997 and Reform of 2001. In order to avoid simultaneity bias, these variables are all scaled 
to the population in 1997 rather than to contemporaneous population. Summary statistics are 
again reported in Table 1. Figure 4 shows Reforms of 1997 and 2001 jointly for the four 
municipalities that received the largest increase or decrease in general grants in either the first 
                                                 
14 For instance, a municipality loosing 25 per cent of its grant in the first stage received a transition grant of 20 
per cent of the permanent change in 1997, of 15 per cent in 1998, of 10 per cent in 1999 and of 5 per cent in 
2000. A municipality that saw its grant reduced by 40 per cent would be eligible for a positive transition grant 
during 7 years. In the fourth year, the remaining instalments were bought off. 
15 In the second stage, supplementary grants ensured that grant changes became effective in five annual steps, of 
10, 15, 25, 25 and 25 per cent, respectively (BZK, 2000). Municipalities losing more than one hundred guilders 
(45 euro) per capita received a redemption grant in the fourth year, in a similar way as in stage 1. 
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or the second stage – excluding the 24 out of 419 municipalities in our sample for which the 
time pattern of the reform-induced change in grants was atypical because of a redemption 
grant. Figure 5 shows Reform of 1997 for the municipality of Bloemendaal, which received 
the largest redemption grant.  
 
2.3 Placebo: decentralization of school accommodation 
We use the decentralization of school accommodation in 1997 to validate our identification 
strategy. This reform changed the way of funding a service that was already provided. School 
buildings for children under 12 used to be financed by the central government, which 
provided funds to the school boards and organisations that built and maintained schools. This 
task was decentralized to municipalities in 1997. In order to provide them with the necessary 
means, the general grant was raised by the amount spent previously by the central 
government, minus an ‘efficiency deduction’ of about 7 per cent. As the general grant is non-
earmarked, municipalities were free to spend the extra funds as they liked, but they had to 
take over the task of providing adequate school buildings. Therefore, most of the additional 
money could not be spent on an improvement of public services or a reduction of taxes, so we 
would not expect to find substantial capitalization. 
 The extra funds were allocated to municipalities according to a formula derived in a 
way similar to the new general grant allocation system that was introduced in 1997 and 2001 
(see above), of which it now forms a part.16 The new funding system was introduced 
gradually using transition grants, in a way not unlike the gradual introduction of the new 
general grant allocation system described above.17 Transition grants included some minor 
additional grants relating to school accommodation and sport parks that could not be 
separated out. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the permanent change in grants due to 
the decentralization of school accommodation, for the transition grant and for the sum of these 
                                                 
16 Some of the variables of the school buildings formula, like inhabitants younger than 20 and minorities, were 
introduced simultaneously with the general grant reform. It is possible, however, to split the weights of these 
variables into the part which is related to school buildings and the part which is not. 
17 To this end, the funds previously spent by the central government within the territory of each municipality 
were calculated and subtracted from the new budget per municipality. If the result was negative, the municipality 
received a transition grant that capped the annual reduction to 0.75 per cent of the amount previously spent 
within the municipality. This transition grant was paid out during a maximum of 5 years (1997 up to 2001). For 
instance, if a municipality received 2.5 per cent less than was previously spent within its territory, it received, in 
1997, a supplementary grant of 1.75 per cent of the amount previously spent; in 1998 it received a 
supplementary grant of 1.0 per cent of this amount, in 1999 of 0.25 per cent of this amount and in 2000 and 2001 
nothing. If the reduction in funds for school buildings exceeded 3.75 per cent, the redemption grant was spread 
out over the entire period. For technical reasons, municipalities where school building budgets increased could 
not receive a negative supplementary grant. To avoid negative supplementary grants, every municipality 
received a positive ‘base grant’, to which the rest of the supplementary grant (positive or negative) was added. 
This base grant was financed by temporarily (1997-2001) reducing the main budget of the general grant. 
 9
variables, which we define as the ‘Reform of financing school buildings’. Again, these 
variables are all scaled to the population in 1997.  
 
 
3 Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Specification and identification strategy 
The impact of general grants on house prices is estimated using the model 
 , , 2 ,log i t i t i i t i tP t G         , (1) 
where Pi,t is a hedonic house price index for municipality i in year t, α is a municipality fixed 
effect, β is a year fixed effect, t is a linear time trend that is allowed a municipality-specific 
effect, Gi,t–2 is the general grant per capita lagged by two years and εi,t is an error term. The 
dependent variable will be replaced by local property tax revenue and municipal staff per 
capita in subsequent analyses, as discussed in subsections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.  
 Following Hilber et al. (2011), we use a semi-log specification for the estimation of 
house price capitalization. Theory predicts a linear relationship (see e.g., Barrow and Rouse, 
2004), yet least-squares estimates of a linear model are more sensitive to outliers. Moreover, 
the municipality and year fixed effects capture unobserved heterogeneity more accurately in a 
semi-log model. For instance, changes in macro-economic variables like the interest rate that 
have proportionate rather than additive effects on house prices are not well controlled for in a 
linear specification. We show below that the estimation of a linear model yields very similar 
capitalization rates, once proportionate municipality and year fixed effects are removed from 
the house price index.  
 Estimation of the model in Equation (1) by ordinary least squares may yield biased 
results for various reasons. For instance, if grants increase because the central government 
devolves a task to municipalities, something that occurred frequently in our research period, 
house prices are likely to be unaffected if the additional funds just cover additional expenses. 
In that case, the unobserved change in tasks that comes with the change in grants creates an 
omitted variables bias. It is also possible that changes in the socioeconomic composition of a 
municipality affect both grants and house prices. For instance, a rise in the share of wealthy 
households will reduce the amount of grants through the fiscal equalization scheme, while 
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there may also be an independent effect on house prices.18 Furthermore, the reform may be 
targeted at municipalities with low or decreasing house prices, which would also induce 
systematic correlation with local house price dynamics through some other channel than 
capitalization. 
 Our strategy for dealing with endogeneity of per capita general grants consists of two 
main ingredients. In the first place, we instrument this variable with the change in grants 
induced by the reform of the general grant allocation – i.e. the variable Reforms of 1997 and 
2001 jointly as defined in the previous section. Identification on changes in grants due to this 
reform does not lead to bias from omitted tasks, because it left tasks unaffected. The reform 
also predates dynamics in socioeconomic composition that are contemporaneous with the 
dependent variable, because changes in grants were already fixed before it was 
implemented.19 Hence, contemporaneous changes in the socioeconomic composition of a 
municipality cannot drive both the reform and changes in house prices. However, 
contemporaneous changes in socioeconomic composition may still be driven by reform-
induced changes in grants, so that variables that correlate with socioeconomic composition are 
‘bad controls’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).20 We therefore exclude socioeconomic or 
demographic control variables from our specification. 
 The inclusion of municipality-specific linear time trends in our model constitutes the 
second main ingredient of our identification strategy. Municipality fixed effects control for 
any targeting of the reform on time-invariant characteristics of municipalities that correlate 
with house prices levels. However, the reform may also favour municipalities in which house 
prices trend downwards, possibly as a result of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. As 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate, the reform-induced change in grants varies nonlinearly over time. 
Our estimates of capitalization may therefore be identified on deviations of this pattern from a 
linear time trend. The exclusion restriction is that after controlling for municipality and year 
fixed effects, such deviations do not correlate systematically with house price deviations from 
a linear time trend through other channels than capitalization. While one could imagine the 
                                                 
18 House prices may rise if people have a preference for living near wealthy or highly educated households, or if 
the variety of amenities such as shops, restaurants and cultural facilities on offer in an area depends on the 
income level of its residents (see e.g. Brueckner et al., 1999).  
19 Transition grants were based on municipal characteristics in the last year before each of the two stages of the 
grant revision came into effect. As a result, they reflect only changes in allocation formulas, not changes in local 
characteristics. Furthermore, the first stage of the revision was based on an analysis of realized spending in 1990 
and budgeted spending for 1992, while the second stage was based on an analysis of realized spending in 1995 
and budgeted spending for 1997 (Van Zaalen, 2002). 
20 For example, municipalities may invest additional grants in local amenities that facilitate gentrification, thus 
altering their age and income composition.  
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general grant reform to target municipalities on a downward trajectory, it seems unlikely that 
policymakers targeted on predicted nonlinearities in this trajectory.  
 We validate our exclusion restriction by identifying on each of the two stages in which 
the reform was implemented separately and by identifying on the change in grants due to 
decentralization of school accommodation. If correlation of the reform with subsequent house 
price dynamics through omitted variables were an issue even after controlling for arbitrary 
linear time trends, it seems unlikely that this would affect each of the two weakly correlated 
stages in the same way. Hence, validity of our exclusion restriction is supported if identifying 
on either Reform of 1997 or Reform of 2001 yields similar results. Identification on the 
placebo Reform of financing school buildings instrument should not yield substantial 
capitalization, as this reform came with additional spending obligations.  
 Our identification strategy does not account for the fact that some systematic 
correlation of the reform of general grant allocation with subsequent house prices may occur 
through tax base equalization. If a reform-induced rise in grants capitalizes into house prices, 
then partial equalization of the property tax base will lower subsequent general grants. This 
would induce a downward bias in our estimate of the capitalization rate. Quantitatively, 
however, the implied bias is small, because of the limited role of property taxation. Under the 
assumption of full capitalization, it never exceeds 6 per cent over our period of observation.21  
 Finally, our identification strategy would not work out in a world with full information 
and perfect foresight. Forward looking behaviour implies that any new information on the 
reform should have capitalized as soon as it became publicly available. Since the structure of 
the reform was already by and large decided on prior to 1995, this would mean that most of 
the capitalization had already occurred before our period of observation. To the extent that 
information on the reform did indeed capitalize when it was announced, our estimate of the 
capitalization rate is conservative. However, we conjecture that most citizens only became 
aware of the reform in general grant allocation and the way in which it affected their own 
municipality, when its effect was felt through a change in public service levels or in property 
taxes. The public outcry when Wassenaar, a municipality that experienced one of the largest 
reductions in general grants, raised property taxes sharply in 2003 is exemplary in this 
respect: in a world with full information and perfect foresight, this outcry should have 
                                                 
21 In early years, the equalized property tax base was not adjusted to contemporaneous house prices (see footnote 
13), so that capitalization of general grants could not give rise to bias. Furthermore, there is some variation over 
time in the rate at which the property tax base is equalized.  
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occurred at least seven years earlier.22 Furthermore, we find that capitalization effects are 
strongest two years after the reform-induced change in grants has occurred, which seems a 
plausible time lag for adjusting public service levels and property tax rates.  
 
3.2 Data 
We estimate equation (1) for the period 1995-2010. A number of municipal amalgamations 
occurred during this period, so we aggregate all variables in our analysis to the 2010 
classification of municipalities.  The five northern island municipalities are excluded and we 
merge a few other very small municipalities in our data, because the number of observed 
housing transactions would otherwise be too small to estimate a meaningful house price 
index. This leaves us with a sample of 419 municipalities out of a total of 430. 
 The house price index is estimated on all housing transactions over our period of 
observation that where conducted by members of the Dutch Association of Realtors (NVM), 
which covers the majority of all owner-occupied housing transactions in the Netherlands. 
Transactions of both single family units and apartments for permanent residence are 
considered, while dwellings on land lease are excluded. We impute dwellings as not being on 
leased land if this information is missing and if less than 5 per cent of all dwellings in the 
municipality are on leased land.23 This leaves a sample of 1,614,735 observations, or 241 
transactions per municipality/year combination on average. Table 1 provides summary 
statistics on the number of observed housing transactions per municipality and year. The log 
of the transaction price in 2010 euros is regressed on a large number of dwelling 
characteristics and on 16 × 419 municipality/year-specific fixed effects.24 The price index is 
then constructed from these fixed effects and scaled in such a way that its transactions-
weighted average corresponds to the average price in our sample of housing transactions.  
 General grants are observed for the period 1992-2010. The source of all our data for 
general grants, reforms and transition grants is the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which has 
computed the permanent changes in grants by subtracting grant allocation according to the old 
formula from the allocation according to the new formula (BZK, 1997, 2000). General grants 
and transition grant amounts are inflated to 2010 euros for each year. Permanent changes are 
                                                 
22 Wassenaar managed to put off adapting to the lower grant until 2003 by consuming its substantial financial 
reserves. 
23 It is verified in a robustness analysis that leaving out the imputed observations does not change our main 
result. 
24 The dwelling characteristics include plot size (for single family units), size of the dwelling, volume, number of 
rooms, kitchens and bathrooms, number of floors, dwelling type, period of construction, availability of a balcony 
or garden, parking space, quality of maintenance and location. Attribute effects are differentiated for single 
family units and apartments whenever relevant. 
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inflated to 2010 euros in the year in which they are introduced. Subsequent years are not 
deflated relative to this base year because grant amounts grow annually in tandem with central 
government spending, which takes account of inflation.  
 The analysis of local property tax revenue per capita uses total residential property tax 
revenue from 1997 onwards, calculated as tax base (obtained from Statistics Netherlands) 
times tax rate (obtained from COELO). This variable sums revenues from a tax on owners 
and a tax on users of residential property, the latter of which was abolished in 2006. The 
analysis of municipal staff per 1000 inhabitants uses staff employed by municipalities in full 
time equivalents, which is available from 1998 onwards from the Ministry of Interior Affairs. 
Information on the number of inhabitants per municipality is provided by Statistics 
Netherlands. Finally, personal income in 2001, which is used for descriptive purposes only, is 
obtained also from Statistics Netherlands. It refers to the average disposable income for 
persons who had a job throughout the year.  
 
3.3 Results on capitalization 
Table 3 contains our baseline results. In this table and in the remainder of the paper, reported 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. As seen in the first column of Panel A, 
estimating the model in Equation (1) with OLS while excluding linear time trends yields a 
weakly significant positive association between the house price index and general grants per 
capita. Entering linear trends provides a first pass at controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity that may bias this estimate. The second column shows that doing so indeed both 
raises the coefficient and reduces the standard error of the estimate. However, these linear 
trends may still be a poor control for omitted tasks to the extent that variation in grants was 
driven by decentralization of tasks or by changes in the socioeconomic composition of 
municipalities. These potential sources of bias are removed by instrumenting grants with the 
reform. Columns (3) and (4) show that this raises the coefficient considerably, consistent with 
our expectations. Results turn out to be hardly sensitive to the inclusion of linear time trends, 
however, indicating that the reform is not systematically correlated with trends in house prices 
through other channels than capitalization.  The Kleibergen-Paap statistic indicates that our 
instrument is strong.  
First stage results are shown in Panel B of Table 3. An additional euro of reform-
induced change in grants corresponds to about one additional euro in general grants, although 
the difference from 1 is statistically significant for the estimate in column (4). A large 
deviation would have been worrisome, as it would imply that part of the variation in general 
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grants came from other changes that correlate with the reform and that are potentially 
endogenous (see e.g. Lundqvist, 2013).  
 Quantitatively, the coefficient in column (4) of Table 3, which is our preferred 
specification, implies that a 1 euro rise in grants per capita increases house prices by 0.0333 
per cent. At a weighted average transaction price of 235,850 euro, this corresponds to an 
increase of about 78 euro. Figure 6 shows the implied reform-induced house price change per 
municipality. Municipalities at the 90th percentile of the distribution of reform-induced 
changes in grants gained 4,273 euro per dwelling, while losses amounted to 5,916 euro per 
dwelling at the 10th percentile of this distribution. Using a real discount rate of 3 per cent, the 
present value of a 1 euro rise in annual grants equals 77 euro for an average household of 2.3 
persons, implying full capitalization of central government grants.25 In the 95 per cent 
confidence interval surrounding this estimate, capitalization rates would be at most 29 per 
cent higher or lower. Furthermore, using a discount rate of 4 per cent would raise the 
capitalization rate with about 33 per cent.  
 Results of identifying grants on either of the two reforms are reported in Table 4. Both 
instruments still yield strong identification. Estimates from the specifications that include 
linear time trends are statistically significant and of similar magnitude as our preferred 
estimate in column (4) of Table 3. More specifically, neither specification rejects our 
preferred estimate at a significance level of 5 per cent. Nevertheless, the negative and 
insignificant estimate of grants identified on the 2001 stage when linear trends are excluded 
from the model indicates systematic correlation between this stage and trends in house prices 
through omitted variables, while this does not appear to be an issue for the larger part of the 
reform that took place in 1997. Note also that the first stage coefficients deviate substantially 
from 1 for the 2001 reform. While the magnitude of this deviation is larger for the 
specification that includes trends, it is estimated much more precisely for the specification 
without trends. Thus the 2001 reform appears to be correlated with trends and possibly also 
deviations from trends in other changes in grants that are potentially endogenous.  
 Our placebo analysis is reported in Table 5. The reform of financing school buildings 
identifies changes in grants with sufficient strength, yet it does not yield a statistically 
significant impact of grants on house prices. Our preferred estimate is rejected at a 1 per cent 
level of significance for the specification that includes linear time trends. These results are 
                                                 
25 Over the period 1995-2010, the real rate of return on Dutch government bonds with a ten year maturity was 
about 2.5 per cent on average. Uncertainty about future changes in the allocation of grants may warrant a 
considerable risk premium on top of this rate, so the 3 per cent discount rate is likely conservative.  
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consistent with our prior expectation that additional grants should not capitalize in house 
prices to the extent that they come with additional tasks. Note also that the first stage 
coefficient for the specification that includes linear trends is close to 1, although this does not 
hold for the specification without trends.  
 Appendix Tables 1 to 5 report various alternative robustness checks that overall 
support our main results. In the first of these tables, we estimate a linear model instead of a 
semi-log model. Proportionate municipality and year fixed effects are removed from the 
house price index first by regressing the logarithm of this index on municipality and year 
fixed effects. The residual is then transformed to levels in such a way its transactions-
weighted average corresponds with the average price in our sample of housing transactions. 
Appendix Table 1 reports estimates of variants of Equation (1) in which this index replaces 
the dependent variable. Results are almost identical to the baseline results in Table 3. In 
particular, the estimate for our preferred specification indicates that a 1 euro rise in grants per 
capita increases house prices by about 78 euro. 
 Experiments with alternative time lags are shown in Appendix Table 2. Consistent 
with our expectation that capitalization occurs only when public service levels or tax rates 
have been adjusted, the capitalization effect is strongest for a 2 year time lag.  
 Appendix Table 3 explores how our results are affected by the peaks in the reform-
induced change in grants for municipalities that received a redemption grant. In the first two 
columns, we estimate baseline specifications for the subsample of municipalities that did not 
receive redemption grants. Alternatively, we show results for a specification in which the 
redemption grant is removed from our instrument in columns (3) and (4), or in which it is 
smoothed out over subsequent years in such a way that municipality’s reform-induced annual 
grant change is maximized at 5 per cent in columns (5) and (6). The last two variants are 
illustrated for the municipality of Bloemendaal in Figure 5. Overall, it appears that estimates 
are somewhat higher than our baseline estimate, particularly for the specifications that include 
linear time trends, for which the first-stage coefficients are also larger than 1.  
 Since the transition grant for the reform of school finances included some minor 
additional grants relating to school accommodation and sport parks that could not be 
separated out, we verify in Appendix Table 4 that grants do not capitalize in house prices if 
we identify them on the reform excluding transition grants. While the transition grant for the 
reform of school buildings does not formally belong to the general grant, we have added it to 
the general grant throughout the analysis in order to be able deal with the reform of school 
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finances in a consistent way. In this table, however, we exclude the transition grant from the 
general grant as well.  
 Finally, Appendix Table 5 contains a host of alternative robustness checks. The first 
column of this table shows results for a hedonic price index that was estimated on the 
1,337,728 transactions for which land lease status was not imputed. The second column 
verifies that our baseline result is unaffected by including the transition grant for the school 
accommodation reform in the general grant. The four largest municipalities of Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht are left out of the sample in column (3), as these 
municipalities negotiate separately over grants with the central government. Municipalities 
that received a bailout at some point during our sample period are left out in column (4). 
Column (5) verifies robustness to leaving out observations for which the house price index 
was based on no more than 20 observations. Finally, in columns (6) and (7), observations are 
weighted with the average number of housing transactions per municipality and the number of 
inhabitants in 1997, respectively. All specifications yield statistically significant estimates and 
none of them rejects our preferred estimate at a significance level of 5 per cent. 
 
3.4 Results on the flypaper effect 
The impact of general grants on local taxes is estimated with a variant of equation (1), in 
which the logarithm of house prices is replaced with total residential property tax revenue per 
capita, which is available from 1997 onwards. We use the same identification strategy. The 
corresponding exclusion restriction is that after controlling for municipality and year fixed 
effects, any deviations of the reform-induced change in grants from a linear time trend do not 
correlate systematically with deviations of local property tax revenue from a linear time trend 
through other channels. 
 Table 6 reports estimation results in the same format as our baseline results in Table 3. 
Grants are found to affect residential property tax revenue negatively and estimates are 
statistically significant in all specifications. Identification on the reform raises the coefficient, 
while inclusion of trends reduces it somewhat. First-stage coefficients are close to 1. In our 
preferred specification in Column 4, a 1 euro rise in grants per capita reduces property tax 
revenue per capita by 16 cents, so that more than 80 cents of this euro are not passed on to 
residents through lower taxes, consistent with the flypaper effect.  
 Appendix Table 6 repeats the validation tests of Tables 4 and 5. Columns 1 and 2 
show results identified on the 1997 stage of the reform, while estimates in Columns 3 and 4 
are identified on the 2001 stage. Neither of the specifications that include time trends rejects 
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our preferred estimate at a significance level of 5 per cent. The impact of grants is identified 
on the placebo reform of financing school buildings in Columns 5 and 6. As expected, the 
estimate is close to zero in the specification that includes trends. Curiously, it is significantly 
negative in the specification without trends. However, the first stage coefficient deviates 
substantially from 1 for this specification, so it may be biased because of correlation of the 
2001 reform with trends in other changes in grants that are endogenous and for which the 
specification in Column 6 controls. 
 
3.5 Results on municipal staff 
For municipal staff per 1000 inhabitants, available from 1998 onwards, we use the same 
approach as for residential property tax revenue, implying a similar exclusion restriction. 
Results are shown in Table 7. The impact of grants on municipal staff is statistically 
insignificant in all specifications except the specification that is identified on the reform and 
excludes trends, in which the estimated effect is negative. Validation tests reported in 
Appendix Table 7 are passed as, like in our preferred estimate in Column 4 of Table 7, all 
coefficients except for the specification identified on the 2001 reform excluding trends are 
statistically insignificant.  
 Nevertheless, our preferred estimate is sufficiently precise to rule out a substantial 
effect of grants on municipal staff. The largest effect in the 95 per cent confidence interval is 
1.58, meaning that 1000 euros of additional grants per capita would raise municipal staff with 
1.58 FTEs per 1000 inhabitants. Even if a civil servant would cost 60,000 euros per year, 
which is a generous upper bound, then expenditure on municipal staff would still amount to 
only 10 cents per euro. 
 This finding may raise the question how municipalities that see their grants increased 
can improve public services without hiring more staff. A first answer is that the money may 
be spent on capital rather than labour, for instance when it is invested in buildings, roads and 
public transport facilities. In the second place, the provision of many municipal services is 
contracted out. Real estate development is again a relevant example. Services in the domain 





4 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Our empirical analysis shows that a reform that was designed partly to better compensate for 
disadvantageous socioeconomic composition fully capitalized into house prices. Only a small 
share of the reform-induced change in grants was passed on to residents through local taxes or 
spent on municipal staff. Hence, changes in grants appear to have been largely accommodated 
through an adjustment of the provision of public services that are valued by the marginal 
homebuyer, whereas our results are inconsistent with the presence of a bureaucratic flypaper 
effect.  
 The combination of limited income discretion at the local level and a dominant role of 
centrally assigned tasks may partly explain our findings, as it could result in underprovision of 
certain local public services. More local income and spending discretion, for instance through 
a larger reliance on local taxes rather than grants, may therefore enhance welfare.  
 The distributive effects of capitalization imply limitations on the use of fiscal 
equalization as an instrument for reducing real income disparities, as property owners are 
generally not the poorest inhabitants of municipalities that receive more grants.26 However, in 
view of the popular resistance to nonmarginal differences in local public services in the 
Netherlands, the promotion of categorical equity is arguably a more important objective of 
fiscal equalization. Although the realization of this objective may appear to be less vulnerable 
to capitalization, the implication is still that improved local services come at the expense of a 
cut in private consumption for renters in the private sector and for homeowners who enter the 
market after the introduction of fiscal equalization – i.e. the majority in the long run. Hence, 
the promotion of categorical equity for these households is only legitimate to the extent that 
society values their consumption of public services more than the satisfaction of their other 
needs (Wyckoff, 1995). It is not obvious why this should be the case, though, since the 
politicians that determine local public service provision are selected by local voters.  
 The efficiency rationale for fiscal equalization is less affected by capitalization, as it 
does not depend on the distribution of benefits within municipalities. One source of 
inefficiency arises when local governments engage in redistributive policies.27 Buchanan 
                                                 
26 See e.g., Oakland (1994) and Ladd and Yinger (1994) for more discussion.  
27 The literature provides various alternative efficiency grounds for fiscal equalization, relating for instance to 
fiscal externalities and rent sharing (Flatters et al., 1974; Boadway and Flatters, 1982; Albouy, 2012) or 
interjurisdictional insurance (Persson and Tabellini, 1996a and 1996b; Bucovetsky, 1997; Lockwood, 1999). 
Allers (2012) argues that fiscal equalization enables proper yardstick competition, as fiscal disparities that are 
not transparent to voters bias interjurisdictional comparisons of public service levels and tax rates.  
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(1950) already noted that places with a positive ‘fiscal residuum’, for instance because of a 
large share of rich households, would attract too many households – see Boadway and Flatters 
(1982) for a formal analysis. This argument seems also relevant in the Dutch context, because 
of the substantial redistributive tasks assigned to municipalities.28 For instance, without any 
equalization of spending needs, municipalities with a large share of households on welfare 
could hardly afford any other public services, thus inefficiently reducing the quality of life. 
The capitalization of an equalizing grant demonstrates its effectiveness in restoring the 
attractiveness of such places to the marginal homebuyer. Nevertheless, optimal equalization 
of spending needs and fiscal capacity may take a different shape when motivated by 
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TABLE 1 
Summary statistics (baseline regression sample) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   overall between within   
Panel data 
Real house price index 6704 214951 62705 49030 39158 66915 516630 
Number of housing transactions 6704 241 363 343 120 1 3687 
General grant per capita 6704 0.663 0.168 0.117 0.120 0.288 1.738 
Reforms of 1997 and 2001 jointly 6704 -0.009 0.043 0.033 0.027 -0.271 0.237 
Reform of 1997 6704 -0.009 0.043 0.034 0.026 -0.264 0.237 
Reform of 2001 6704 0.000 0.012 0.007 0.010 -0.136 0.185 
Transition grant 1997 6704 0.002 0.020 0.009 0.017 -0.116 0.483 
Transition grant 2001 6704 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.007 -0.073 0.322 
Reform of financing school buildings 6704 0.044 0.028 0.009 0.026 0.000 0.180 
Transition grant for school buildings 6704 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.113 
Property tax revenue per capita 5866 0.119 0.038 0.028 0.026 0.034 0.507 
Municipal staff per 1000 inhabitants 5445 7.218 2.163 2.067 0.642 0.189 31.847 
Cross-sectional data 
Permanent change 1997 419 -0.015 0.057   -0.264 0.142 
Permanent change 2001 419 0.000 0.022   -0.136 0.081 
Permanent change for school buildings 419 0.055 0.011   0.032 0.096 
Number of inhabitants in 1997 419 37096 56937   4001 715148 
Redemption of 1997 transition grants 419 0.003 0.026   0.000 0.346 
Redemption of 2001 transition grants 419 0.001 0.012   0.000 0.232 
Personal income in 2001 419 20.226 2.041   16.529 31.886 
Notes: All grant amounts (including reforms and transition grants), personal income and the property tax revenue are 
expressed in 1000’s of 2010 euros. Municipal staff is measured in full time equivalents. Reforms, permanent 




Correlations between reforms and income 
 Permanent change 1997 Permanent change 2001 Permanent changes in 
1997 and 2001 jointly 
Permanent change in 2001 -0.221***   
 0.000   
Permanent changes in 1997 
and 2001 jointly 
0.927*** 0.161***  
0.000 0.001  
Log of personal income in 
2001 
-0.761*** 0.366*** -0.630*** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Test statistics for deviation from zero are reported below each correlation coefficient.  






Panel A – Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
 OLS  IV  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General grant per capita, 2 years lagged 0.0639* 0.106*** 0.292*** 0.333*** 
(0.0335) (0.0281) (0.0547) (0.0475) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends  Yes  Yes 
     
R-squared 0.388 0.357   
Kleibergen-Paap F   698.0 593.6 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reforms of 1997 and 2001 jointly, 2 years lagged   0.959*** 1.182*** 
  (0.0363) (0.0485) 
     
R-squared   0.591 0.659 
Notes: N = 6704, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-




Identification on 1997 and 2001 reforms separately 
Panel A – IV estimates. Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
 1997 reform 2001 reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General grant per capita, 2 years lagged 0.345*** 0.353*** -0.220 0.253*** 
(0.0663) (0.0553) (0.192) (0.0789) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends  Yes  Yes 
     
Kleibergen-Paap F 645.3 471.0 57.73 28.83 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reform of 1997, 2 years lagged 0.890*** 1.189***   
(0.0350) (0.0548)   
Reform of 2001, 2 years lagged   0.652*** 1.455*** 
  (0.0859) (0.271) 
     
R-squared 0.591 0.646 0.460 0.658 
Notes: N = 6704, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-





Placebo: identification on reform of financing school buildings 
Panel A – IV-estimates. Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
 (1) (2) 
General grant per capita, 2 years lagged 0.0467 -0.201 
(0.0739) (0.127) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends  Yes 
   
Kleibergen-Paap F 102.4 102.7 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reform of financing school buildings, 2 years lagged 1.917*** 1.148*** 
(0.189) (0.113) 
   
R-squared 0.513 0.650 
Notes: N = 6704, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within-municipality correlation. Significance levels:  




The flypaper effect 
Panel A – Dependent variable: Property tax revenue per capita 
 OLS  IV  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General grant per capita, 2 years lagged -0.130*** -0.0915*** -0.236*** -0.165*** 
(0.0241) (0.0219) (0.0398) (0.0301) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends  Yes  Yes 
     
R-squared 0.173 0.0955   
Kleibergen-Paap F   884.7 681.7 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reforms of 1997 and 2001 jointly, 2 years lagged   0.887*** 1.150*** 
  (0.0298) (0.0440) 
     
R-squared   0.381 0.345 
Notes: N = 5866, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-







Impact of grants on municipal staff 
Panel A – Dependent variable: Municipal staff per 1000 inhabitants 
 OLS  IV  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General grant per capita, 2 years lagged -0.450 0.161 -2.399** -0.0332
(0.519) (0.806) (1.078) (0.821) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends  Yes  Yes 
     
R-squared 0.0410 0.0410   
Kleibergen-Paap F   1050 751.0 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reforms of 1997 and 2001 jointly, 2 years lagged   0.877*** 1.130*** 
  (0.0271) (0.0412) 
     
R-squared   0.364 0.298 
Notes: N = 5445, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-





APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Baseline results reproduced for real house price index in levels, 
demeaned for years and municipalities 
 OLS  IV  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General grant per capita, 2 years lagged 14439* 24259*** 68502*** 77624*** 
(7830) (6576) (12850) (11183) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends  Yes  Yes 
     
R-squared 0.000452 0.101   
Kleibergen-Paap F   698.0 593.6 
Notes: N = 6704, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-
municipality correlation. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 2 
Results for alternative time lags 
Number of lags n: 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A – IV estimates. Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
General grant per capita,  
n years lagged 
0.151*** 0.276*** 0.333*** 0.331*** 0.229*** 0.105* 
(0.0404) (0.0398) (0.0475) (0.0691) (0.0713) (0.0611) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific  
time trends 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6704 6704 6704 6704 6285 5866 
Kleibergen-Paap F 721.4 649.6 593.6 673.2 924.4 1498 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reforms of 1997 and 2001 
jointly, n years lagged 
1.123*** 1.170*** 1.182*** 1.150*** 1.095*** 1.025*** 
(0.0418) (0.0459) (0.0485) (0.0443) (0.0360) (0.0265) 
       
R-squared 0.416 0.568 0.659 0.736 0.750 0.768 
Notes: Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-municipality correlation.  




APPENDIX TABLE 3 
Alternative ways to deal with redemption of transition grants 
Panel A – IV estimates.  Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
 Without municipalities 
receiving redemption 
Redemption removed 
from transition grant 
Redemption grant 
smoothed over time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
General grant per capita,  
2 years lagged 
0.401*** 0.398*** 0.320*** 0.445*** 0.324*** 0.461*** 
(0.0645) (0.0593) (0.0558) (0.0468) (0.0578) (0.0549) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific  
time trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 6320 6320 6704 6704 6704 6704 
Kleibergen-Paap F 406.6 456.3 578.7 553.5 541.8 506.4 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reforms of 1997 and 2001 
jointly, 2 years lagged 
0.997*** 1.303*** 0.957*** 1.275*** 0.951*** 1.276*** 
(0.0495) (0.0610) (0.0398) (0.0542) (0.0409) (0.0567) 
       
R-squared 0.590 0.654 0.591 0.659 0.590 0.659 
Notes: Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-municipality correlation. Significance levels: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 4 
Identification on reform of financing school buildings,  
excluding transition grants 
Panel A – IV estimates.  Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
 (1) (2) 
General grant per capita, 2 years lagged 0.129 -0.178 
(0.0794) (0.143) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends  Yes 
   
Kleibergen-Paap F 174.0 53.87 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reform of financing school buildings, excluding 
transition grants, 2 years lagged 
3.053*** 1.751*** 
(0.231) (0.239) 
   
R-squared 0.524 0.648 
Notes: N = 6704, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within-municipality correlation. Significance levels:  






APPENDIX TABLE 5 
Miscellaneous robustness checks 
Panel A – IV estimates. Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
General grant per capita,  
n years lagged 
0.330*** 0.333*** 0.346*** 0.325*** 0.285*** 0.227*** 0.205*** 
(0.0482) (0.0473) (0.0489) (0.0474) (0.0479) (0.0645) (0.0776) 
Municip. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific  
time trends 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6704 6704 6640 6160 6379 6704 6704 
Kleibergen-Paap F 593.6 605.5 617.6 584.7 551.7 125.2 92.17 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reforms of 1997 and 
2001 jointly,  
2 years lagged 
1.181*** 1.184*** 1.173*** 1.192*** 1.186*** 1.142*** 1.195*** 
(0.0485) (0.0481) (0.0472) (0.0493) (0.0505) (0.102) (0.125) 
R-squared 0.659 0.659 0.722 0.672 0.638 0.652 0.651 
Notes: Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-municipality correlation.  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The columns of this table correspond to the following robustness checks:  
(1) No imputation of zero for missing observations for land lease in municipalities with less than 5% land lease; 
(2) Removal of transition grant for financing school buildings from general grant; 
(3) Four largest municipalities are removed from the sample; 
(4) Municipalities that received a bailout are removed from the sample; 
(5) Observations that are based on no more than 20 housing transactions are removed from the sample; 
(6) Observations are weighted by the average number of housing transactions per municipality; 





APPENDIX TABLE 6 
Robustness checks for the flypaper effect 
Panel A – IV estimates. Dependent variable: Property tax revenue per capita 
 1997 reform 2001 reform Placebo 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
General grant per capita,  
2 years lagged 
-0.253*** -0.181*** -0.137** -0.0690 -0.0971*** 0.0123 
(0.0485) (0.0311) (0.0593) (0.0535) (0.0361) (0.0343) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific  
time trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F 603.8 536.4 110.0 30.06 101.8 99.94 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reform of 1997,  
2 years lagged 
0.792*** 1.193***     
(0.0322) (0.0515)     
Reform of 2001,  
2 years lagged 
  0.804*** 1.261***   
  (0.0767) (0.230)   
Reform of financing 
school buildings,  
2 years lagged 
    1.425*** 1.071*** 
    (0.141) (0.107) 
R-squared 0.377 0.311 0.166 0.341 0.242 0.324 
Notes: N = 5866, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-
municipality correlation. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 7 
Robustness checks for Impact of grants on municipal staff 
Panel A – IV estimates. Dependent variable: Municipal staff per 1000 inhabitants 
 1997 reform 2001 reform Placebo 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
General grant per capita,  
2 years lagged 
-1.927 -0.0784 -4.419* 0.258 -1.938 0.0531 
(1.307) (0.930) (2.340) (0.888) (1.632) (1.009) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific  
time trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F 572.2 633.4 132.8 33.65 101.6 90.43 
Panel B – First stage corresponding to IV results 
Reform of 1997,  
2 years lagged 
0.768*** 1.171***     
(0.0321) (0.0465)     
Reform of 2001,  
2 years lagged 
  0.860*** 1.192***   
  (0.0746) (0.206)   
Reform of financing 
school buildings,  
2 years lagged 
    1.077*** 1.025*** 
    (0.107) (0.108) 
R-squared 0.359 0.256 0.123 0.274 0.195 0.260 
Notes: N = 5445, number of municipalities = 419. Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-
municipality correlation. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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